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Abstract
This study analyses the determinants of the sacrifice ratio; i.e., the output cost of
disinflation. The empirical literature so far has used several model specifications, indi-
cating the degree of model uncertainty. Even for those factors where consensus on their
significance has been reached, such as trade openness and central bank independence,
considerable uncertainty still surrounds their estimated sign. Motivated by the above,
we estimate the most important drivers of the sacrifice ratio based on Bayesian model
averaging, for a panel data set of 42 countries. Our findings confirm part of the evi-
dence reported in the prior empirical literature, while it sheds light on the importance
of other factors.
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1 Introduction
During the 1980s, price stability became the primary concern for monetary policy in devel-
oped countries. The adoption of such a policy was a key element of what is now known as
Great Moderation (Bernanke, 2004). At the same time, a new wave of academic research
emerged, trying to explain on theoretical and empirical grounds the benefits of such a pol-
icy. One key aspect of the empirical literature was the short-run output losses that one
economy may experience in the effort to reduce inflation. These effects were quantified by
the ratio of cumulative output losses from a reduction of 1% of inflation. The magnitude of
the sacrifice ratio, as well as, its determinants were an important piece of information for
central banks. After the global financial crisis of 2008 and the recession that followed, many
economies faced disinflation periods with associated output losses, while central banks of
many developed economies significantly lowered their policy rates. New research appeared
emphasizing the conditions of zero lower bound (Gust et al., 2017). Measuring the sacri-
fice ratio in such an environment became once again an important indication of the welfare
effects of a recessionary period (Ascari and Ropele, 2012).1
Across the literature, three different approaches are typically followed to estimate the
sacrifice ratio. The first approach is based on the estimation of a Phillips curve. The slope of
the Phillips curve measures the response of output to changes in inflation and therefore, this
estimate is used as a proxy of the inflation-output trade-off (Gordon et al., 1982; Gordon,
2013). The second method is the usage of structural VAR model (Cecchetti and Rich,
2001; Huh and Jang, 2007). In this setting, the sacrifice ratio is defined as the ratio of the
cumulative response of output due to a monetary shock over the cumulative response of the
inflation rate. The last method is based on the identification of actual disinflation episodes
and the calculation of the associated losses in real output as a result. The exact calculation
1Sometimes the term “output-inflation trade-off” is used instead of the term “sacrifice ratio”. However,
the output-inflation trade-off is used to describe both the cost of output losses from a disinflation episode
(sacrifice ratio) and the output gains from an increase in inflation (benefice ratio) (Jordan, 1997). Here, we
use the terms “sacrifice ratio” and “output-inflation trade-off” interchangeably indicating only the former
(i.e., the output cost of disinflation).
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procedure is discussed in Ball (1994). Due to its analytic simplicity, this method proves to
be the most popular across the empirical literature.
The contribution of the present study is summarized as follows. Firstly, we estimate
the sacrifice ratios for a panel of 42 countries. For each examined economy, we collect data
for 13 variables that have been identified in the prior literature as potential drivers of the
sacrifice ratio. These variables capture a range of macroeconomic, monetary and institutional
features. Secondly, we identify the most significant drivers through a method that takes into
account model uncertainty. Our results prove to be quite robust in a number of alternative
assumptions and specifications. The remaining paper is structured as follows. Section 2
provides an overview of prior studies, while Section 3 describes the data collection process.
The methodology is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 presents the main set of results, while
Section 6 includes a series of robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature Review and Motivation
As outlined in the introductory section, the empirical research on the sacrifice ratio determi-
nants reaches to mixed conclusions.2 This conflicting empirical evidence reflects the results’
sensitivity to different subsets of the covariates used in each study. This leads to an omitted
variable bias problem (see, for instance, Caporale and Caporale (2008), p.1544). Before dis-
cussing how we treat this problem, we provide a summary of the variables that have been
used as driving forces of the sacrifice ratio. These factors addressed in the literature can be
classified into the following broad categories.
The first group, which is typically treated as the benchmark set of regressors, is broadly
related to features specific to the disinflation episode, i.e., its speed and duration, as well as,
the peak and the change in inflation over the disinflation period. The literature has proposed
conflicting views on the effect of the speed of disinflation. On the one hand, in the presence
2Here we focus only on papers that study the determinants of output-inflation trade-off. For a literature
regarding the relation of the trade-off with specific macro variables, such as inflation and inflation variability
see Bakas and Chortareas (2019).
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of wage and price rigidity, gradualism is shown to be less costly (Taylor, 1983) while, on the
other hand, the choice of a quick disinflation process is associated with higher credibility gains
and thus, with lower output losses (Sargent, 1983). The empirical findings in Ball (1994)
corroborate the latter view; the speed of the disinflation episode is shown to be negatively
associated with the sacrifice ratio. The argument in favour of a cold-turkey process rather
than gradualism has also been corroborated by the results of subsequent studies including,
among others, Jordan (1997), Caporale and Caporale (2008) and Gonçalves and Carvalho
(2009). Conversely, the results by Mazumder (2014b) casts doubt on the findings in favour
of a quicker disinflation process when measurements of the sacrifice ratio rely on core rather
than on headline inflation. In addition to the speed of disinflation, the peak of inflation is
also considered among the basic episode-specific determinants. While the earlier empirical
findings of Ball (1994) do not corroborate the theoretical predictions of a negative association
between the sacrifice ratio and the peak of inflation, Ball et al. (1988), Caporale and Caporale
(2008), Roux and Hofstetter (2014) reach conclusions in support of the latter hypothesis.
The second broad class of factors focuses on the features of the monetary policy institu-
tional framework and, in particular, the role of inflation targeting (IT), central bank indepen-
dence (CBI) and central bank transparency. The findings by Gonçalves and Carvalho (2009),
supporting the view that countries that have adopted an IT regime experienced less costly
disinflations, have been challenged by Brito (2010) on the grounds of the sample employed
and the impact of the Maastricht adjustment. More recently, Roux and Hofstetter (2014)
show that IT results in lower sacrifice ratios only in the case of long disinflation episodes. As
far as the central bank transparency is concerned, the evidence remains mixed. Although
earlier empirical results support an inverse relationship between central bank transparency
and the sacrifice ratio (Chortareas et al., 2003), in subsequent studies central bank trans-
parency does not appear to be an important factor (Gonçalves and Carvalho, 2009; Brito,
2010; Roux and Hofstetter, 2014).
In contrast to the presumption that CBI, via enhanced credibility, is more to likely to
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be negatively associated with the sacrifice ratio, several studies have emphasized that higher
CBI is associated with more costly disinflations (Jordan, 1997; Daniels et al., 2005). The
empirical evidence by Caporale and Caporale (2008) suggest that CBI is not a significant
determinant of the sacrifice ratio when controlling for the type of the government and other
factors.3 On the other hand, the results by Mazumder (2014a) support that a negative
correlation between central bank independence and the sacrifice ratio appears to hold for
non-OECD economies. An inverse relationship has been also corroborated by the empirical
findings of Brumm and Krashevski (2003) as well as Diana and Sidiropoulos (2004) through
the negative effect of central bank independence on inflation persistence.
A third group of potential determinants relates to the openness of the economies (e.g.
trade openness and capital mobility), government indebtedness, labor market variables, the
exchange rate regime, as well as, measures of the political stance. The results by Gonçalves
and Carvalho (2009) and Roux and Hofstetter (2014) suggest that the public debt-to-GDP
ratio does not appear to be an important determinant of the sacrifice ratio. The role of trade
openness has received increased interest with a number of studies empirically examining the
relationship between openness and inflation. Motivated by the hypothesis of an inverse
association between openness and inflation by Romer (1993), earlier evidence by Temple
(2002) indicate a negative, albeit weak, relationship between openness and the sacrifice
ratio. Subsequent findings by Daniels et al. (2005) and Daniels and VanHoose (2009) suggest
a positive relationship between openness and the sacrifice ratio when conditioning for CBI,
while their interaction suggests that higher trade openness confines the effect of CBI on the
sacrifice ratio. In addition to trade openness, Daniels and VanHoose (2009) obtain similar
results when capital mobility is considered. Accounting for the interaction of capital mobility
with CBI, greater capital mobility is associated with a higher sacrifice ratio. In contrast,
the results by Bowdler (2009), taking also into account the exchange rate regime, indicate
3The findings by Caporale and Caporale (2008) have been criticized in the replication study by Katayama
et al. (2011) supporting, in turn, a positive association when conditioning for the interaction of CBI and
openness.
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a negative association between openness and the sacrifice ratio when a post-1980 sample of
disinflation episodes is considered. A thorough discussion on the theoretical channels and
the empirical evidence on the nexus between openness and the sacrifice ratio is provided by
Daniels et al. (2015). Daniels and VanHoose (2013) provide evidence in favor of a positive
association between the sacrifice ratio and the exchange rate pass through. The conclusions
of Caporale and Caporale (2008) and Caporale (2011) suggest that right-wing governments
experience less costly disinflations than left-wing on the basis of their stronger anti-inflation
reputation. Recently, Daniels et al. (2019) provide evidence on the negative impact of the
level and the change in inflation expectations on the sacrifice ratio.
A summary of the above discussion is given in Table 1. Apart from the different model
specifications, the estimated effects differ significantly across studies. Figures 1a-4a plot
the reported partial correlations against the corresponding standard errors for the most
frequently used variables (∆π, peak, length and trade openness), while Figures 1b-4b depict
the corresponding histograms.4 From all graphs, it is evitable the degree of heterogeneity
across the literature. The most pronounced heterogeneity across studies is observed for the
peak and trade openness (Figures 3 and 4), where almost half of the estimates having an
opposite sign. This is an indication of model uncertainty. As there is no a priori theoretical
guidance regarding the significance or non-significance of certain factors, there is space for
different model specification. This is the concept of open-endedness of theories developed by
Brock and Durlauf (2001). The approach that allows to tackle this issue is a model averaging
technique. In a contemporary paper, Katayama et al. (2019) find that the only important
driver is the length of disinflation episodes. Our paper differentiates in the following ways.
Firstly, we extend the examined countries from 19 economies to a group of 42 ones. Secondly,
we search for the most robust drivers among a pool of 13 variables that covers a series
of macroeconomic, monetary and institutional characteristics of the examined economies.
4We avoid showing the direct estimates or the t-statistics as these estimates are not comparable across
studies. An easy way to make comparisons across studies is the usage of partial correlations. For more
details, see Doucouliagos et al. (2012).
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Thirdly, we additionally use an averaging technique that takes into account not only model
uncertainty but also any potential unobserved heterogeneity caused by the large sample of
countries. Due to these three extensions, our results not only confirm the importance of the




As described in the previous section, our analysis is based on a sample of 42 economies. In this
section, we analyse the specific definitions of the dependent variables. We collect data for real
GDP and inflation rates for all countries with a full dataset over the period spanning 1974q1-
2015q4. Then, we identify the disinflation episodes for each country. Following Ball (1994),
the first step to identify a disinflation episode, based on quarterly data, is to define the peak
and trough in trend inflation (πT ), with the latter calculated as the nine-quarter moving
average in actual inflation. The inflation peak, marking the beginning of the disinflation
process, corresponds to the quarter in which trend inflation (πT,peakt ) is higher compared









πT,peakt ). By an analogy to the above, the trough signifies the end of the episode in which
trend inflation (πT,trought ) is lower against the previous and subsequent four quarters. For
the calculation of output losses during the disinflation episode, one needs first to estimate
output at its potential. According to the assumptions by Ball (1994), actual output reaches
potential at the inflation peak and four quarters after the inflation trough, growing log-
linearly in-between. Output losses are then calculated as the sum of the differences between
actual and trend output. The sacrifice ratio of the disinflation episode is then measured as
the total output losses over the difference in trend inflation.
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The number of disinflation episodes differs across economies; for those countries with
available data after 1990, we identify one (for Russia and Latvia) and two disinflation episodes
(for Estonia). On the contrary, for other economies we find more than four (Finland and
Iceland, for instance). For the majority of countries, we are able to calculate three disinflation
episodes and therefore, three sacrifice ratios. The total amount of episodes/observations is
153. Building on the seminal methodology proposed by Ball (1994), which proves to be
the most popular across the related literature, Zhang (2005) and Hofstetter (2008) have also
suggested two alternative methods to measure the sacrifice ratio. In particular, the approach
proposed by Zhang (2005) takes into account the “long-lived” effects of a disinflation episode
on output while the method by Hofstetter (2008) allows to capture both “long-lived” and
lagged effects on output. In addition, Mazumder (2014b) calculates the sacrifice ratio based
on all three variants, albeit relying on core rather than headline inflation. In the present
study, we calculate the sacrifice ratios based on the standard Ball’s method. The estimates
and the countries included in the study are provided in the Table A1 in the Appendix. The
data for the real GDP and inflation are drawn from the IMF-IFS and World Bank.
The starting point for the choice of the sacrifice ratios determinants hinges on the vari-
ables that have already been used in the literature. The first four indicators, which pertain
to the specific characteristics of the disinflation process (peak, ∆π, length and speed) are
collected through the estimation method of Ball (1994) as explained above. The next step
is the collection of macroeconomic variables. The most popular variables that have been
frequently used in prior studies are measures of trade and capital openness. Both are proxies
of how integrated the economies are to the rest of the world. In other words, they capture
the globalisation effect. A proxy that measures a closely-related aspect is the concept of
financial development (Mishkin, 2009). Even though no measure of financial development
has been used in prior studies, we include a proxy of it. In this way, we investigate whether
more advanced financial systems affect differently the inflation-output trade-off than less
developed ones. An additional macro-variable, which has also been included in several prior
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studies, is the public debt-to-GDP ratio. Therefore, we also include it in our list of deter-
minants. Finally, we use a proxy of employment protection to take into account the labour
market characteristics. The choice for this variable was subject to data availability regarding
our country sample.
The next category considers variables related to features of the monetary policy frame-
work. In particular, we include a dummy that takes the value of 1 when a country is an
inflation targeter (IT), a variable that measures the exchange rate flexibility and a proxy of
CBI. On top of the above variables that have already been addressed in the sacrifice ratio
literature, our study also examines whether the separation of monetary policy and banking
supervision may have an impact on the sacrifice ratio. Although recent studies in monetary
policy have emphasised the implications for monetary authorities from the separation of
monetary policy from banking supervision (Ioannidou, 2005; Dincer and Eichengreen, 2012;
Chortareas et al., 2016), this study is the first to the best of our knowledge to examine the
effect of separating monetary policy and banking supervision on the sacrifice ratio. Roux
and Hofstetter (2014), among others, have explicitly emphasized the role of credibility via
both the speed of disinflation and the adoption of an inflation targeting regime and the as-
sociated gains in terms of output losses during a disinflation episode. Under a similar vein,
a central bank being only in charge of the monetary policy function may be associated with
enhanced credibility and thus, lower sacrifice ratios. Against this background and in order
to be as inclusive as possible regarding the model specification, we include as an additional
regressor a dummy that takes 0 when the central bank is involved in banking supervision,
additional to its monetary policy task, and 1 when banking supervision is delegated to a
separate institution (see Table A2). Table 2 presents the description of each variable along





The key purpose is to identify the key drivers of the sacrifice ratio taking into account
model uncertainty. This section discusses the methodological framework that we follow.
The econometric model can be written as:
srit = c+ x
j
itβ
j + eit, eit ∼ N(0, σ2I) (1)
where sr is the sacrifice ratio for country i at time t, the x contains the explanatory
variables and c denotes the intercept. The uppercase j indicates that the above equation is
valid under model Mj. In our case, the usage of 13 regressors results to 2
13 (more than 8
thousand) alternative models to choose from. This means that the model space consists of
M1,...,Mj models, where j ∈ [1, ..., 213].
What BMA technique is doing is to assign a prior probability to each model, then to
update these priors based on the data, and finally, to average across models. Therefore, the
key feature is that the inference is not based on individual models, but on weighted averages.
Based on Bayes rule, the posterior density for parameters β is given by the following:
p(β|sr, x,Mj) ∝ p(sr|β, x,Mj)p(β|Mj) (2)
where p(sr|β, x,Mj) is the likelihood function and p(β|Mj) is the prior density. Treating
Mj as a parameter that its posterior has to be estimated using data plus a prior, Bayes rule
can be written as:
p(Mj|sr, x) ∝ p(sr|Mj, x)p(Mj) (3)
The left-hand side term is the posterior model probability (PMP), while the right-hand
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side term is the marginal likelihood function, p(sr|Mj, x), times the prior probability of
model, Mj. Therefore, what is only needed for determining this posterior density is the cal-
culation of the marginal likelihood. Combining equations (2) and (3), the marginal likelihood




p(sr|βj, x,Mj)p(βj|Mj, x)dβj (4)




p(βj|sr, x,Mj)p(Mj|sr, x) (5)
where p(βj|sr, x,Mj) is the posterior distribution under model Mj and p(Mj|sr, x) is the
posterior model probability. The above equation shows that the posterior model probabilities
are used as weights. More precisely, the posterior density of βj for each model Mj is weighted
by the posterior model probability of each model Mj.
Depending on how frequently a regressor appears in the alternative Mj models determines
whether the regressor can be considered as robust determinant. This leads to the notion of
posterior inclusion probability (PIP), which is just the sum of posterior model probabilities





with i ∈ [1, K] indicating that each regressor has a specific PIP. The higher the PIP of a
variable is, the greater its explanatory power. When the posterior inclusion probability of a
variable is close to one, then almost all models of the model space include this variable. Here,
we follow Kass and Raftery (1995) rule as a guide for the level of significance. Specifically,
the effect of a variable is considered as weak, positive, strong, and decisive if its PIP lies
between 0.5-0.75, 0.75-0.95, 0.95-0.99 and 0.99-1, respectively.
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4.2 The choice of priors
4.2.1 Parameter priors
As any Bayesian analysis, the BMA approach requires determining prior beliefs. More
precisely, two kinds of beliefs are needed; prior for parameters and prior for the models.
As far as the parameters are concerned, we have to specify the prior distributions for c, β
and σ. Given the lack of any prior knowledge, we follow the standard convention assuming
non-informative priors for the intercept and the variance; that is, p(c) ∝ 1 and p(σ) ∝ σ−1.
Regarding the β parameters which are the main interest of this study, we follow Zellner (1986)
and assume that they are centered at zero and the variance is proportional to σ2(g(XiXi)
−1),
where g is the so-called Zellner’s g hyperparameter that indicates the level of our uncertainty.
The larger the g is, the larger the prior coefficient variance and, therefore, the higher the
uncertainty. In summary, the coefficients’ distribution depends on g:
βi|g ∼ N(0, σ2(g(XiXi)−1) (7)
In this study, we employ three different choices regarding g.





− 1), where α ∈ (2,4] with a Beta distribution mean equal to 2
α
. (In
the Appendix (Table A3) we keep α at a fixed value).
• Secondly, we follow the ‘empirical Bayes’ g approach proposed by George and Fos-
ter (2000) and Hansen and Yu (2001), where g is determined by using information
contained in the current dataset. This amounts to g = argmaxgp(sr|Mj, X, g).
• Finally, we set g = N , which leads to the most trivial case of unit information prior
(UIP), where N is the sample size.
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4.2.2 Model priors
The model prior setting that gives the probability of each model Mj is written as:
p(Mj) = θ
kj(1− θ)K−kj (8)
where K is the maximum number of regressors, kj is the number of regressors included
in the model Mj and θ is a hyperparameter that expresses the prior inclusion probability of
each regressor. Based on this assumption, we discern between 2 different cases:
• Setting θ=1
2
assigns equal probability to all models under consideration. The expected
prior model size is equal to m̃=K
2
and, therefore, favours models of medium size. In
our case, m̃=13
2
=6.5. This leads to the uniform model prior, where each model has the
same probability p(Mi) = 2
−K . In Section 6.1, we relax this assumption when we take
into account fixed effects.
• We use an alternative model prior that is less restrictive as far as the model size is
concerned, assuming a hyperprior beta-binomial with a prior model size of K/213 from
which the value of θ is drawn.
4.3 MCMC sampler algorithm
The total amount of the K = 13 independent variables results to 213 (more than 8 thousand)
alternative models to choose from. Even though this number is not extremely high, we follow
the standard and the most up-to-date practice of ‘building from scratch’ the posterior model
distribution using a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampler algorithm. At step 1,
the sampler at model M1 has a posterior model probability of a certain value, p(M1|, sr, x).
At step 2 another model, M2, is proposed to replace the previous one, M1. The algorithm









If the model M2 is rejected, the next model M3 is proposed and compared with the
M1, using the same algorithm. With a very high number of iterations (here 200,000 with
100,000 used as burn-ins), the posterior model probability is empirically approached. In our
case, due to the moderate amount of explanatory variables the analytical solution can be
found. Therefore, we estimate the posterior model density as well as the posterior inclusion
probabilities based analytically on all models as well as computationally as described above
with a model space of 8,000 models. The results under both approaches are identical. We
choose to present the method and the results based on the above computational scheme as
this is the standard practice in Bayesian literature (see for instance, Arin et al. (2019) and
Steel (2020)).
5 Main Results
Table 3 and 4 present the first set of results under different assumptions for model and
parameter priors.5 As explained earlier, we follow Kass and Raftery (1995) rule as a guide to
the level of significance. Specifically, the effect of a variable is considered as weak, positive,
strong, and decisive if its posterior inclusion probability (PIP) lies between 0.5-0.75, 0.75-
0.95, 0.95-0.99 and 0.99-1, respectively. The most robust determinants of the sacrifice ratio
are the length and the speed of disinflation episode as well as the central bank independence
(CBI) and the capital openness.
The length of the disinflation episode proves to be one factor for which the majority
of prior studies agrees on. Regardless of the various model specifications that have been
employed, the estimated parameter is consistently found to be positive (although not always
statistically significant) as Figure 2b shows. Precisely, 93% of the estimates are found to
5Additional results are presented in Table A3 in the Appendix.
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be positive. Our BMA exercise confirms this result indicating that a longer disinflation
episode is associated with greater output losses and, thus, a higher sacrifice ratio (Daniels
and VanHoose, 2013). Furthermore, the speed of a disinflation comes with a negative sign.
This is in accordance with the majority of previous findings. A negative correlation gives
supports to Ball (1994) argument in favour of cold turkey strategy; i.e., a quick disinflation
process is accompanied with less output loss.
Central bank independence is the only aspect of the institutional monetary policy frame-
work that has been so extensively included in previous studies. Jordan (1997) is the first
to suggest a positive relationship between CBI and sacrifice ratio. A central bank that is
more independent from the political regime tends to encounter higher sacrifice ratios. This
relationship is also confirmed by Daniels et al. (2005). However, more recent studies have
challenged this view. Caporale and Caporale (2008) conclude that there is no significant
effect. Mazumder (2014a) finds that higher CBI from political pressures helps economies
to lose less output during disinflations. According to his analysis, this result holds only for
non-OECD countries. Our empirical outcome supports a negative relationship. This evi-
dence validates the first theoretical studies (Walsh, 1995) that argue that more CBI tends
to flatten the Phillips curve; i.e., reducing the sacrifice ratio.
The concept of capital openness has received more limited attention in the prior empirical
literature. Daniels and VanHoose (2009) report both positive and negative effects based on
model specification. Our evidence suggests that more open economies tend to experience
higher sacrifice ratios. Daniels and VanHoose (2009) conclude that their empirical outcome
is more in favour of a positive relationship, even though their theoretical framework predicts
a reduced sacrifice ratio due to the globalisation effect. Our results confirm this positive
link. This evidence is also related to the literature that examines the spill-over effects on
real activity that comes from the emerging markets after 1980s (World Bank, 2016). This
does not come as a surprise considering that part of our country sample consists of countries
that experienced sudden changes in their capital account. The remaining variables do not
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seem to be robust drivers of sacrifice ratio. Other institutional and monetary aspects, such
as IT, do not prove to be significant (Brito, 2010).6
Table 3 here
Table 4 here
6 Robustness analysis and further evidence
6.1 Country heterogeneity
The first robustness exercise is the inclusion of country heterogeneity. We employ the BMA
estimator proposed by Moral-Benito (2012) and Moral-Benito and Roehn (2016). Assuming
uniform model prior this estimator assigns equal probability to each model, that is θ=0.5.
Regarding the parameters, unit information prior is assumed. Since this extension works
only for balanced panels, we have to adjust our sample and, specifically, the number of
ratios per country to be included in our sample.7 The maximum number of observations
is achieved when we include three ratios per country. The alternative options, of either
selecting four episodes per country or dropping out countries with less than three episodes,
reduce significantly our sample. Therefore, the optimal choice is to include three estimated
ratios per country, which results in 102 observations in total. The results, as shown in Table
5, confirm our baseline findings; the length of disinflation, CBI and capital openness still
remain robust drivers of the sacrifice ratio, with the same estimated sign. Moreover, when
taking into account cross-country effects, trade openness is also found to be negative and
highly significant in line with Daniels et al. (2015).
Table 5 here
6In the case of the unbalanced panel dataset, we do not include the proxy variable for the employment
protection due to data availability. In the next section, where the number of countries is reduced, this
variable is used.
7Both Moral-Benito (2012, p.573) and Moral-Benito and Roehn (2016, p.151) explicitly state that BMA
with fixed effects can only be applied in balanced panels.
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As a further robustness check, we use different values of θ while we control for fixed
effects. In this way, we test whether the results remain the same when we shift the model
distribution to either smaller or larger sizes. The mean prior model size is given by kθ=k/2,
with k being the number of regressors. Table 6 shows the PIPs under two different prior
inclusion probabilities. Specifically, we test our benchmark results by choosing two different
prior inclusion probabilities; by setting θ=0.34 results in a smaller prior model size of kθ=4.42
while θ=0.69 implies a larger model size of 8.97. Under both assumptions, our results
remain qualitatively the same as in the benchmark specification for the role of central bank
independence and capital openness. The length of the disinflation episode is not significant
only in the case of the low prior inclusion probability (θ=0.34). Irrespective of the model
size, trade openness is still found to be an important determinant of the sacrifice ratio. Table
A4 in the Appendix summarises all the empirical specifications presented in the paper.
Table 6 here
6.2 Removing outliers and subsample analysis
As an additional robustness check, we remove from our initial dataset the disinflation episodes
with extreme values of the sacrifice ratio or the initial inflation. The results are reported in
Table 7 (without fixed effects) and Table 8 (with fixed effects). The length and the capital
openness continue to be the most robust drivers in all specifications. In both cases (with
and without fixed effects), CBI does not seem to be a significant factor anymore. On the
contrary, when the outliers are removed Separation seems to become statistically significant
with a positive sign.
Finally, we explore whether some results are driven by the fact that our sample consists of
OECD and non-OECD countries. Following Masanjala and Papageorgiou (2008) we create
a dummy for OECD countries. In order to do this split, we proceed without taking fixed
effects as we want to use the total available sample (and not just the restricted balanced
sample explained above) with the outliers being removed. The evidence shown in Table 9
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remains the same indicating that the results are not driven by the non-OECD countries.
Like the previous evidence (Tables 7 and 8), the most robust drivers of the sacrifice ratio are
the length and capital openness. CBI seems to be sensitive to the existence of outliers and
becomes insignificant when they are removed. The opposite is true for the Separation where





In the present study, we identify the most robust determinants of the sacrifice ratio taking
into account model uncertainty. Focusing on a unbalanced panel of 42 countries, consisting
of 153 disinflation episodes in total, we confirm the importance of factors for which the
prior empirical literature has provided broadly conclusive evidence; a longer disinflation
process tends to increase the associated output losses. Our study, however, reveals the
importance of other variables whose both significance and their exact effect on the sacrifice
ratio vary across prior studies. Capital openness is shown to be positively associated with the
output cost of disinflation. Additionally, central bank independence is found to be negatively
correlated with the sacrifice ratio. However, this relationship weakens when outliers are
removed. The majority of our results prove to be robust to a series of checks including the
assumptions of alternative priors and country heterogeneity. In addition, when cross-country
fixed effects are taking into account, our evidence reveals the importance of trade openness
in determining the sacrifice ratio. A potential extension to our BMA exercise is to explore
the determinants of the sacrifice ratio when the latter is calculated based on the approach by
Zhang (2005) and Hofstetter (2008). Future research could additionally consider the benefice
17
ratio (as done by Jordan (1997)) and explore its driving forces. This would allow for a more
thorough understanding as well as the evaluation of the factors behind the two stages of the
economy i.e., between deflationary and inflationary episodes. Finally, a systematic research
for determining the factors behind the heterogeneity of the reported estimates would shed
new light on the output cost of the disinflation process. We leave these extensions for future
research.
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Gust, C., Herbst, E., López-Salido, D., and Smith, M. E. (2017). The empirical implications
of the interest-rate lower bound. American Economic Review, 107(7):1971–2006.
Hammond, G. (2012). State of the art of inflation targeting. handbook 29. Center for Central
Banking Studies, Bank of England.
Hansen, M. H. and Yu, B. (2001). Model selection and the principle of minimum description
length. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 96(454):746–774.
Hofstetter, M. (2008). Disinflations in latin america and the caribbean: A free lunch? Journal
of Macroeconomics, 30(1):327–345.
21
Huh, H.-s. and Jang, I. (2007). Nonlinear phillips curve, sacrifice ratio, and the natural rate
of unemployment. Economic Modelling, 24(5):797–813.
Ilzetzki, E., Reinhart, C., and Rogoff, K. (2008). Exchange rate arrangements entering the
21st century: which anchor will hold? Unpublished manuscript and data available online:
http://personal. lse. ac. uk/ilzetzki/data. htm.
Ioannidou, V. P. (2005). Does monetary policy affect the central bank’s role in bank super-
vision? Journal of Financial Intermediation, 14(1):58–85.
Jordan, T. J. (1997). Disinflation costs, accelerating inflation gains, and central bank inde-
pendence. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 133(1):1–21.
Kass, R. E. and Raftery, A. E. (1995). Bayes factors. Journal of the American Statistical
Association, 90(430):773–795.
Katayama, H., Ponomareva, N., and Sharma, M. (2011). Central bank independence, polit-
ical regimes, and the sacrifice ratio: A replication study of caporale and caporale (2008).
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 43(5):1035–1042.
Katayama, H., Ponomareva, N., and Sharma, M. (2019). What determines the sacrifice ratio?
a bayesian model averaging approach. Forthcoming in Oxford Bulletin of Economics and
Statistics.
Liang, F., Paulo, R., Molina, G., Clyde, M. A., and Berger, J. O. (2008). Mixtures of g
priors for bayesian variable selection. Journal of the American Statistical Association,
103(481):410–423.
Masanjala, W. H. and Papageorgiou, C. (2008). Rough and lonely road to prosperity: a
reexamination of the sources of growth in africa using bayesian model averaging. Journal
of Applied Econometrics, 23(5):671–682.
22
Mazumder, S. (2014a). Determinants of the sacrifice ratio: Evidence from oecd and non-oecd
countries. Economic Modelling, 40:117–135.
Mazumder, S. (2014b). The sacrifice ratio and core inflation. Journal of Macroeconomics,
40:400–421.
Mishkin, F. S. (2009). Globalization and financial development. Journal of Development
Economics, 89(2):164–169.
Moral-Benito, E. (2012). Determinants of economic growth: a bayesian panel data approach.
Review of Economics and Statistics, 94(2):566–579.
Moral-Benito, E. and Roehn, O. (2016). The impact of financial regulation on current
account balances. European Economic Review, 81:148–166.
Romer, D. (1993). Openness and inflation: theory and evidence. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 108(4):869–903.
Roux, N. D. and Hofstetter, M. (2014). Sacrifice ratios and inflation targeting: the role of
credibility. International Finance, 17(3):381–401.
Sargent, T. (1983). Stopping moderate inflations: The methods of poincare and thatcher,
in: Dornbusch, r. and m. simonsen (eds.), inflation, debt and indexation.
Steel, M. (2020). Model averaging and its use in economics. Forthcoming in Journal of
Economic Literature.
Taylor, J. B. (1983). Union wage settlements during a disinflation. American Economic
Review, 73(5):981–993.
Temple, J. (2002). Openness, inflation, and the phillips curve: a puzzle. Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking, pages 450–468.
23
Walsh, C. (1995). Output-inflation tradeoffs and central bank independence. FRBSF Eco-
nomic Letter, (sep22).
Zellner, A. (1986). On assessing prior distributions and bayesian regression analysis with
g-prior distributions. Bayesian Inference and Decision Techniques.





Table 1: Summary of existing literature
Study Main Explanatory variables used Number of countries
Ball (1994) Peak, Speed, ∆π, Length, Contract duration, Wage rigidity 19
Temple (2002) Peak, ∆π, Length, Contract duration, Wage rigidity, TO 19
Daniels et al. (2005) Peak, ∆π, Contract duration, Length, TO, CBI 19
Caporale and Caporale (2008) Peak, Speed, ∆π, TO, CBI, Political regime 18
Gonçalves and Carvalho (2009) Peak, Speed, Debt, Transparency, IT 30
Bowdler (2009) TO, CBI, Length, EX*TO 41
Daniels and VanHoose (2009) Peak, ∆π, Length, Contract duration, TO, CBI, CO 16
Bowdler and Nunziata (2010) Speed, Peak, TO, CBI, Wage rigitity Empl. protection 17
Brito (2010) Speed, Peak, Debt, Transparency, IT 30
Katayama et al. (2011) Speed, Peak, ∆π, TO, CBI, Political regime 18
Daniels and VanHoose (2013) ∆π, Peak, Length, CBI, Exchange rate pass-through, Union density 20
Mazumder (2014a) ∆π, Length, CBI, IT, TO, Political regime, Debt, IT 189
Mazumder (2014b) Speed, ∆π, Length, CBI, IT, TO 22
Roux and Hofstetter (2014) Speed, IT Debt, Transparency, Peak 21
Notes: This table presents a summary of the explanatory variables used by selected papers discussed in this study.
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Table 2: Variables used in the study
Variable Description Source
Peak Inflation at the start of the episode Own calculations based
the episode on Ball (1994)
∆π Change in trend inflation Own calculations based
on Ball (1994)
Length Length of the disinflation episode Own calculations based
on Ball (1994)
Speed ∆π/Length Own calculations based
on Ball (1994)
Separation Dummy equals 1 when banking Bank Regulation and Supervision Surveys,
supervision is delegated to a separate World Bank; Copelovitch and Singer (2008);
institution other than the central bank Di Noia and Di Giorgio (1999);
central banks websites
Inflation Targeting (IT) IT dummy equals 1 if at the IT adoption dates based
start of the disinflation episode on Hammond (2012)
the IT regime was in force for at
at least 2 quarter as
in Gonçalves and Carvalho (2009)
Central Bank Independence (CBI) Updated CWN index of de jure Bodea and Hicks (2015) and
cental bank independence updated dataset
Trade Openness (TO) sum of exports and imports of World Development Indicators,
goods and services measured as World Bank
as share of GDP
Debt Government debt-to-GDP ratio IMF Historical Public Debt Database
Exchange rate regime (XR) Exchange rate classification Dataset for Ilzetzki et al. (2008)
from soft to hard pegs
Financial Development (FD) Domestic credit to private World Bank
sector as percentage of GDP
Capital Openness (CO) KAOPEN index measuring a Chinn and Ito (2006)
country’s degree of capital
account openness
Employment protection Index of employment protection OECD
Notes: The table presents data sources for the variables included in the analysis.
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Table 3: Main Results I-Alternative model priors
Variable PIPI PIPII Effect on SR Selected prior studies
Peak 0.277 0.436 + Te, DNV, DV1, DV2, Bo
∆π 0.276 0.435 - Ba, DNV, DV1, DV2, Ma1, Ma2
Length 0.811c 0.803c + All studies listed in Table 1
Speed 0.828c 0.816c - Ba, BN, RH, GC, CC, Br
Separation 0.283 0.439 +
IT 0.402 0.530 + Ma2
CBI 0.857c 0.853c - Bo, Ma1, CC
TO 0.490 0.596 + Bo, BN, CC, DNV, DV1, Ma1, Ma2
Debt 0.512 0.610 + GC; Br
EXR 0.281 0.438 - Bo
FD 0.357 0.494 +
CO 0.993a 0.985a + DV1
Notes: PIP stands for posterior inclusion probability, with subscripts I and II indicating uniform and
beta-binomial model prior, respectively. The hyper-g prior is used as parameter prior. a/b/c denotes
decisive/strong/positive evidence of a regressor having an effect, respectively, according to Kass and
Raftery (1995). +/- shows the estimated sign of the posterior mean of the corresponding coefficient. Prior
studies are the studies that find similar evidence. These studies include: Ball (1994)-Ba, Temple (2002)-Te,
Caporale and Caporale (2008)-CC, Bowdler (2009)-Bo, Daniels et al. (2005)-DNV, Daniels and VanHoose
(2009)-DV1, Daniels and VanHoose (2013)-DV2, Gonçalves and Carvalho (2009)-GC, Bowdler and
Nunziata (2010)-BN, Brito (2010)-Br, Daniels and VanHoose (2013)-DV, Roux and Hofstetter (2014)-RH,
Mazumder (2014a)-Ma1, Mazumder (2014b)-Ma2.
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Table 4: Main Results II-Alternative parameters priors
Variable PIPIII PIPIV Effect on SR Selected prior studies
Peak 0.295 0.295 + Te, DNV, DV1, DV2, Bo
∆π 0.294 0.294 - Ba, DNV, DV1, DV2, Ma1, Ma2
Length 0.829c 0.828c + All studies listed in Table 1
Speed 0.845c 0.844c - Ba, BN, RH, GC, CC, Br
Separation 0.302 0.302 +
IT 0.422 0.422 + Ma2
CBI 0.869c 0.868c - Bo, Ma1, CC
TO 0.512 0.512 + Bo, BN, CC, DNV, DV1, Ma1, Ma2
Debt 0.535 0.535 + GC; Br
EXR 0.299 0.299 - Bo
FD 0.376 0.376 +
CO 0.994a 0.993a + DV1
Notes: PIP stands for posterior inclusion probability with subscripts III and IV indicating ‘empirical
Bayes’ g and unit information parameter prior, respectively. The uniform is used as model prior. a/b/c
denotes decisive/strong/positive evidence of a regressor having an effect, respectively, according to Kass
and Raftery (1995). +/- shows the estimated sign of the posterior mean of the corresponding coefficient.
Prior studies are the studies that find similar evidence. These studies include: Ball (1994)-Ba, Temple
(2002)-Te, Caporale and Caporale (2008)-CC, Bowdler (2009)-Bo, Daniels et al. (2005)-DNV, Daniels and
VanHoose (2009)-DV1, Daniels and VanHoose (2013)-DV2, Gonçalves and Carvalho (2009)-GC, Bowdler
and Nunziata (2010)-BN, Brito (2010)-Br, Daniels and VanHoose (2013)-DV, Roux and Hofstetter
(2014)-RH, Mazumder (2014a)-Ma1, Mazumder (2014b)-Ma2.
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Table 5: Robust 1-Results with country-specific fixed effects
Variable PIP Effect on SR Prior studies
Peak 0.679 - BN, RH
∆π 0.417 + CC
Length 0.757c + All studies listed in Table 1
Speed 0.269 - Ba, BN, RH, GC, CC
Separation 0.337 -
IT 0.695 + GC, RH, Ma2
CBI 0.800c - Bo, Ma1, CC
TO 0.939b - Te; DV1
Debt 0.732 + GC; Br
EXR 0.099 - Bo
FD 0.133 +
CO 0.992a + DV1
Empl.Prot. 0.326 + BN
Notes: PIP stands for posterior inclusion probability. Unit information prior and uniform distribution are
used as parameter and model priors, respectively. a/b/c denotes decisive/strong/positive evidence of a
regressor having an effect, respectively, according to Kass and Raftery (1995). +/- shows the estimated
sign of the posterior mean of the corresponding coefficient. Prior studies are the studies that find similar
evidence. These studies include: Ball (1994)-Ba, Temple (2002)-Te, Caporale and Caporale (2008)-CC,
Bowdler (2009)-Bo, Daniels et al. (2005)-DNV, Daniels and VanHoose (2009)-DV1, Gonçalves and
Carvalho (2009)-GC, Bowdler and Nunziata (2010)-BN, Brito (2010)-Br, Daniels and VanHoose
(2013)-DV, Roux and Hofstetter (2014)-RH, Mazumder (2014a)-Ma1, Mazumder (2014b)-Ma2.
Table 6: Robust 2-Results with fixed effects & alternative model priors
PIPs under different prior inclusion probabilities
Variable θ = 0.34 θ = 0.5 θ = 0.69 Effect on SR
Peak 0.417 0.679 0.880c -
∆π 0.191 0.417 0.666 +
Length 0.595 0.757c 0.948c +
Speed 0.218 0.269 0.462 -
Separation 0.222 0.337 0.564 -
IT 0.699 0.695 0.730 +
CBI 0.772c 0.800c 0.902c -
TO 0.866c 0.939b 0.964b -
Debt 0.535 0.732 0.863c +
EXR 0.074 0.099 0.226 -
FD 0.057 0.133 0.208 +
CO 0.986b 0.992a 0.999a +
Empl.Prot. 0.104 0.326 0.404 +
Notes: PIPs stand for posterior inclusion probabilities. θ is the prior inclusion probability for each
regressor. θ=0.5 refers to the uniform model priors considered in the base line case presented in Table 5.
The mean prior model size is given by kθ where k is the number of regressors. In our setting, the mean
prior model size ranges from 4.42 (θ=0.34) to 8.97 (θ=0.69). a/b/c denotes decisive/strong/positive
evidence of a regressor having an effect, respectively, according to Kass and Raftery (1995).
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Table 7: Robust 3a-Excluding Outliers
Variable PIPI PIPII PIPIII PIPIV Effect on SR
Peak 0.266 0.418 0.284 0.284 +
∆π 0.278 0.428 0.296 0.296 -
Length 0.961b 0.965b 0.962b 0.963b +
Speed 0.280 0.431 0.296 0.295 +
Separation 0.774c 0.802c 0.789c 0.789c +
IT 0.656 0.721 0.674 0.674 +
CBI 0.462 0.581 0.484 0.484 -
TO 0.335 0.484 0.356 0.356 +
Debt 0.239 0.393 0.256 0.256 +
EXR 0.625 0.689 0.644 0.643 +
FD 0.430 0.547 0.447 0.643 +
CO 0.978b 0.982b 0.979b 0.979b +
Notes: PIP stands for posterior inclusion probability. The subscripts I, II, III and IV are showing the
combinations of parameter and model priors as defined in Tables 3 and 4. a/b/c denotes
decisive/strong/positive evidence of a regressor having an effect, respectively, according to Kass and
Raftery (1995). +/- shows the estimated sign of the posterior mean of the corresponding coefficient.
Table 8: Robust 3b-Results with fixed effects excluding outliers
PIPs under different prior inclusion probabilities
Variable θ = 0.34 θ = 0.5 θ = 0.69 Effect on SR
Peak 0.364 0.632 0.697 -
∆π 0.2678 0.365 0.416 +
Length 0.701c 0.748c 0.968c +
Speed 0.368 0.412 0.459 -
Separation 0.751c 0.849c 0.899c +
IT 0.452 0.541 0.569 +
CBI 0.421 0.489 0.512 -
TO 0.769c 0.798c 0.801c -
Debt 0.336 0.487 0.541 +
EXR 0.179 0.299 0.379 -
FD 0.118 0.268 0.297 +
CO 0.957b 0.993a 0.999a +
Empl.Prot. 0.0147 0.169 0.172 +
Notes: PIPs stand for posterior inclusion probabilities. θ is the prior inclusion probability for each
regressor. θ=0.5 refers to the uniform model priors considered in the base line case presented in Table 5.
The mean prior model size is given by kθ where k is the number of regressors. In our setting, the mean
prior model size ranges from 4.42 (θ=0.34) to 8.97 (θ=0.69). a/b/c denotes decisive/strong/positive
evidence of a regressor having an effect, respectively, according to Kass and Raftery (1995).
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Table 9: Robust 4-OECD dummy
Variable PIPI PIPII PIPIII PIPIV Effect on SR
Peak 0.217 0.469 0.318 0.387 +
∆π 0.214 0.447 0.348 0.319 -
Length 0.997b 0.975b 0.974b 0.978b +
Speed 0.216 0.411 0.397 0.487 +
Separation 0.757c 0.752c 0.709 0.774c +
IT 0.668 0.703 0.621 0.637 +
CBI 0.635 0.648 0.614 0.601 -
TO 0.368 0.465 0.478 0.436 +
Debt 0.368 0.412 0.368 0.367 +
EXR 0.614 0.625 0.636 0.658 +
FD 0.597 0.556 0.457 0.487 +
CO 0.971b 0.975b 0.968b 0.981b +
OECD 0.247 0.299 0.258 0.279 +
Notes: PIP stands for posterior inclusion probability. OECD stands for a dummy that takes 1 for OECD
economies and 0 otherwise. The subscripts I, II, III and IV are showing the combinations of parameter and
model priors as defined in Tables 3 and 4. a/b/c denotes decisive/strong/positive evidence of a regressor
having an effect, respectively, according to Kass and Raftery (1995). +/- shows the estimated sign of the
posterior mean of the corresponding coefficient.
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Figures
Figure 1: Partial correlations across studies for ∆π
Notes: Figure (a) depicts the scatter plot of the partial correlations, r, and the corresponding standard
errors, ser, for the reported estimates for ∆π. Figure (b) shows the corresponding histogram of the reported
t-statistics.
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Figure 2: Partial correlations across studies for Length
Notes: Figure (a) depicts the scatter plot of the partial correlations, r, and the corresponding standard
errors, ser, for Length. Figure (b) shows the corresponding histogram of the reported t-statistics.
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Figure 3: Partial correlations across studies for Peak
Notes: Figure (a) depicts the scatter plot of the partial correlations, r, and the corresponding standard
errors, ser, Peak. Figure (b) shows the corresponding histogram of the reported t-statistics.
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Figure 4: Partial correlations across studies for Trade Openness
Notes: Figure (a) depicts the scatter plot of the partial correlations, r, and the corresponding standard




Table A1: Countries included in the study
Country Disinflation episode Sacrifice ratio Country Disinflation episode Sacrifice ratio
Argentina 1976q2-1977q4 0 Indonesia 1974q1-1978q2 0.6
Argentina 1984q3-1986q4 0.1 Indonesia 1980q2-1982q4 -1.8
Argentina 1989q2-1997q1 0.2 Indonesia 1983q4-1986q2 -0.9
Argentina 1997q3-2000q1 -4.2 Indonesia 1998q3-2000q4 0.6
Argentina 2003q1-2004q1 -0.1 Indonesia 2001q4-2004q3 0.5
Argentina 2006q1-2008q4 3.1 Indonesia 2005q3-2010q4 0.7
Argentina 2011q1-2012q2 -5.2 Ireland 1981q2-1988q1 3.0
Australia 1975q1-1979q1 -0.8 Ireland 2001q2-2005q1 3.9
Australia 1982q3-1985q1 6.8 Ireland 2007q3-2010q2 1.1
Australia 1989q2-1993q2 2.5 Israel 1974q4-1976q4 -1.5
Australia 1995q3-1998q3 0.5 Israel 1984q4-1988q3 0.1
Austria 1974q4-1979q1 5.3 Israel 1990q1-1993q4 -1.0
Austria 1981q2-1987q3 -0.7 Israel 1994q1-2001q1 -15.5
Austria 1993q1-1998q4 6.2 Israel 2002q2-2004q3 3.2
Belgium 1975q2-1979q2 -0.1 Italy 1975q4-1978q4 -2.1
Belgium 1982q3-1987q4 5.9 Italy 1980q4-1988q1 5.6
Belgium 1990q3-1999q1 29.1 Italy 1990q2-1994q2 4.1
Brazil 1985q2-1986q3 -0.1 Italy 1995q2-1998q4 0.0
Brazil 1989q4-1992q2 0.0 Japan 1980q4-1987q4 5.4
Brazil 1993q4-1998q4 0.0 Japan 1980q4-1987q4 5.4
Brazil 2002q4-2007q2 5.1 Japan 1990q4-1995q4 4.9
Canada 1975q1-1977q3 1.2 Korea 1975q1-1977q4 0.0
Canada 1981q3-1985q4 8.7 Korea 1980q3-1984q4 1.2
Canada 1990q3-1994q2 13.2 Korea 1991q1-1996q4 -0.5
Chile 1974q4-1982q2 -1.0 Korea 1997q4-2000q2 14.7
Chile 1984q3-1988q4 20.7 Latvia 2008q1-2010q4 6.2
Chile 1990q3-2004q4 -24.6 Luxembourg 1975q3-1979q1 1.1
Chile 2008q1-2010q3 5.1 Luxembourg 1982q3-1987q3 3.9
China 1988q3-1991q2 -1.8 Luxembourg 1992q3-1998q4 36.7
China 1994q3-1999q2 -11.8 Mexico 1974q3-1975q4 -0.5
China 1994q3-1999q2 -11.8 Mexico 1977q4-1979q2 -0.1
Colombia 1974q3-1975q4 0.3 Mexico 1983q3-1985q2 -0.3
Colombia 1977q1-1979q2 -3.3 Mexico 1987q3-1994q1 0.2
Colombia 1980q4-1984q2 -10.0 Mexico 1996q2-2007q1 -3.2
Colombia 1991q2-2006q2 50.3 Netherlands 1981q2-1987q3 8.9
Colombia 2008q1-2010q4 7.0 Netherlands 2001q4-2006q1 17.2
Czechia 1992q4-1996q4 0.5 New Zealand 1980q4-1984q2 0.3
Czechia 1997q3-2000q2 4.2 New Zealand 1984q2-1993q1 4.8
Czechia 2001q1-2003q3 2.6 New Zealand 1995q4-1999q1 1.1
Czechia 2008q1-2010q3 5.3 Norway 1975q3-1979q2 -2.1
Denmark 1974q3-1976q4 3.7 Norway 1981q3-1985q3 8.6
Denmark 1980q4-1987q1 0.1 Norway 1987q3-1994q1 15.5
Denmark 1988q4-1994q1 7.4 Portugal 1977q4-1980q4 -0.4
Estonia 2001q2-2003q4 0.2 Portugal 1984q2-1988q1 2.6
Estonia 2007q4-2010q2 9.0 Portugal 1990q2-1999q2 7.3
Finland 1975q1-1979q2 6.2 Portugal 2007q1-2010q1 -2.7
Finland 1981q2-1987q1 -0.1 Russia 1999q3-2007q1 0.6
Finland 1989q4-1996q3 35.8 Slovakia 1994q1-1997q2 -0.7
Finland 2001q1-2005q1 7.2 Slovakia 2000q3-2002q2 0.9
Finland 2007q4-2010q2 8.5 Slovakia 2003q4-2006q4 4.8
France 1975q1-1978q1 2.6 Slovakia 2007q3-2010q2 -7.9
France 1981q2-1987q3 2.3 Slovenia 2001q1-2006q2 7.7
Germany 1981q1-1987q2 6.4 Slovenia 2007q4-2010q3 3.1
Germany 1992q3-1996q3 3.6 South Africa 1981q4-1984q1 7.7
Greece 1974q4-1978q1 -8.1 South Africa 1986q2-1989q2 -0.6
Greece 1980q4-1984q4 -2.5 South Africa 1991q3-1997q3 8.4
Greece 1985q4-1989q1 3.3 South Africa 1997q4-2000q4 6.0
Greece 1991q1-2000q2 11.2 South Africa 2002q2-2005q1 1.4
Hungary 1991q1-1994q2 0.5 South Africa 2008q3-2011q1 5.4
Hungary 1995q4-2003q2 3.1 Spain 1977q2-1988q2 12.3
Iceland 1980q4-1981q4 -0.2 Spain 1990q1-1998q3 12.8
Iceland 1983q1-1987q3 1.2 Spain 2007q3-2010q1 -3.9
Iceland 1988q4-1995q3 2.3 Sweden 1977q2-1979q1 2.3
Iceland 2001q2-2003q4 -0.3 Sweden 1980q4-1987q2 9.2
Iceland 2009q1-2012q1 9.7 Sweden 1990q4-1998q1 13.2
India 1974q2-1976q4 0.0 Sweden 2007q4-2010q1 10.1
India 1981q1-1985q3 -0.7 Switzerland 1974q2-1978q1 8.3
India 1991q3-1994q1 2.0 Switzerland 1982q1-1987q2 9.4
India 1997q3-2000q4 -2.0 Switzerland 1991q1-1998q3 12.9
India 2009q4-2012q1 -8.5 Turkey 1974q3-1976q3 0.0
Continued on next page
Table 10 – continued from previous page
Country Disinflation episode Sacrifice ratio Country Disinflation episode Sacrifice ratio
Turkey 1979q4-1982q4 0.7 UK 1980q3-1984q2 3.2
Turkey 1985q1-1986q4 1.3 UK 1991q1-2001q1 15.1
Turkey 1989q2-1990q2 0.9 US 1974q4-1977q2 4.7
Turkey 1995q2-1996q3 -0.1 US 1980q3-1984q2 4.6
Turkey 1997q3-2005q2 3.0 US 1990q2-1995q1 14.1
Turkey 2007q4-2010q3 21.0 US 2007q3-2010q1 3.1
UK 1975q2-1978q4 3.4
Notes: Sacrifice ratios calculated using the methodology proposed by Ball (1994).
Table A2: Body/agency that supervises banks for prudential purposes
Central bank or single/multiple Single or multiple bank
bank supervisory agencies supervisory agencies





























Notes: Source: The World Bank, Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey, 2019. Question 12.1. Values as
of end 2016.
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Table A3: Alternative hyper-g priors with fixed values for a parameter
Variable PIPA PIPB PIPC PIPD PIPE PIPF Effect on SR
Peak 0.287 0.296 0.305 0.468 0.492 0.513 +
∆π 0.286 0.296 0.305 0.468 0.491 0.512 -
Length 0.812c 0.811c 0.810c 0.831c 0.844c 0.853c +
Speed 0.829c 0.829c 0.827c 0.843c 0.856c 0.864c -
Separation 0.294 0.303 0.312 0.472 0.496 0.516 +
IT 0.412 0.420 0.427 0.563 0.585 0.603 +
CBI 0.857c 0.856c 0.855c 0.876c 0.885c 0.891c -
TO 0.499 0.506 0.512 0.628 0.648 0.664 +
Debt 0.520 0.526 0.531 0.642 0.662 0.678 +
EXR 0.292 0.302 0.311 0.470 0.494 0.515 -
FD 0.367 0.376 0.385 0.526 0.549 0.567 +
CO 0.992a 0.991a 0.990a 0.994a 0.993a 0.992a +
Notes: PIP stands for posterior inclusion probability. Subscripts A, B and C indicate the hyper-g prior
with a having a fixed value of 2.5, 3 and 3.5, respectively with uniform used as model prior. Subscripts D,
E and F indicate the hyper-g prior with a having a fixed value of 2.5, 3 and 3.5, respectively with
beta-binomial used as model prior. a/b/c denotes decisive/strong/positive evidence of a regressor having
an effect, respectively, according to Kass and Raftery (1995). +/- shows the estimated sign of the posterior
mean of the corresponding coefficient.
Table A4: Summary of the estimated specifications
Case Parameter prior Model prior Results in Purpose
i Hyper-g Uniform Table 3 Testing different model priors
ii Hyper-g Beta-binomial Table 3 Testing different model priors
iii Hyper-g with fixed a Uniform Table A3 Testing the robustness of fixed a
iv Hyper-g with fixed a Beta-binomial Table A3 Testing the robustness of fixed a
v Empirical Bayes g Uniform Table 4 Testing different parameter prior
vi UIP Uniform Table 4 Testing different parameter prior
vii UIP Uniform Table 5 Fixed effects
viii UIP Uniform (θ <0.5, θ >0.5) Table 6 Fixed effects & testing model prior
ix Repeat i,ii,v,vi Repeat i,ii,v,vi Table 7 Removing outliers
x Repeat vii,viii Repeat vii,viii Table 8 Removing outliers
xi Repeat i,ii,v,vi Repeat i,ii,v,vi Table 9 Removing outliers & country grouping
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